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I. INTRODUCTION 
As the Internet reaches record amounts of users and is utilized for a variety 
of transactions and activities, how jurisdiction is exercised over those activi-
ties increases in complexity.1  Questions of extraterritoriality arise as countries 
attempt to assert their authority over the Internet in ways that will affect the 
rights of people around the world.  An example of recent extraterritoriality 
jurisdiction expansion is the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Google 
Inc. v. Equustek.2 
In the 7-2 decision of Google Inc. v. Equustek, the court ordered Google 
to delist certain universal source locators (URLs) from its search engine pend-
ing a trial for a patent infringement suit brought by Equustek against Data-
link.3   The underlying action alleged that Datalink sold an Equustek product 
as its own and created an infringing product after misappropriating Equustek’s 
trade secrets.4  The Supreme Court of Canada affirmed an interlocutory in-
junction against Google, a non-party to the litigation, requiring Google to del-
ist the URLs globally because Equustek would “suffer irreparable harm if the 
injunction were not granted.”5 
Google unsuccessfully argued that the extraterritorial reach of this order 
was improper and that its right to freedom of expression should have tipped 
the typical balance of the convenience test in favor of denying the interlocu-
tory injunction.6  The court rejected this argument holding that jurisdiction 
was proper because Google conducted sufficient business in British Columbia 
to establish in personam jurisdiction, and that “[w]hen a court has in personam 
jurisdiction, and where it is necessary to ensure the injunction’s effectiveness, 
it can grant an injunction enjoining that person’s conduct anywhere in the 
world.”7  The court found that if the injunction was restricted to Google Can-
ada, the remedy would be deprived of its intended purpose of preventing ir-
reparable harm, and thus, in order for it to be effective, it must apply globally 
as the “Internet has no borders – its natural habitat is global.”8 
Google also unsuccessfully argued that Canada’s issuance of a global in-
junction “violates international comity” arguing “it is possible that the order 
could not have been obtained in a foreign jurisdiction, or that to comply with 
 
 1 Bertrand De La Chapelle & Paul Fehlinger, Jurisdiction on the Internet: How to Move 
Beyond the Legal Arms Race, OBSERVER RESEARCH FOUNDATION (Oct. 14, 2016), 
https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/gcig_no28_web.pdf (This article originally 
appeared in The Digital Debates: The CyFy Journal). 
 2 Google Inc. v. Equustek Solutions Inc., [2017] 1 S.C.R. 34 (Can.). 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. at ¶ 3. 
 5 Id. at ¶ 42. 
 6 Id. at ¶ 27. 
 7 Id. at ¶ 37-38. 
 8 Id. at ¶ 41. 
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it would result in Google violating the laws of that jurisdiction.”9  The court 
found this argument to be too theoretical finding it doubted freedom of ex-
pression issues would result in a case concerning violation of intellectual 
property rights.10 
This Note focuses on the increasing trend of countries exercising extrater-
ritoriality jurisdiction over Internet activities.  Specifically, this Note argues 
that Google Inc. v. Equustek was wrongly decided, and that a country’s ability 
to issue global injunctions should be prohibited as it sets a dangerous prece-
dent for freedom of expression.  This Note will suggest various other methods 
of dealing with the type of problem presented by the Equustek case.  It will 
conclude by recommending that Equustek should have sought to recover mon-
etary damages from Datalink in France and then requested that Google de-
index URLs in countries with the highest volume of sales lost to Datalink.  If 
Google did not comply with this request, Equustek should have sought an or-
der in those countries compelling Google to de-index Datalink’s URLs. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A. Internet Governance Generally 
 
To fully understand the legal issues surrounding the Google Inc. v. 
Equustek decision, it is necessary to understand the main theories behind In-
ternet governance as well as recent case law supporting an expansion of ex-
traterritoriality jurisdiction over cyberspace. 
The United Nations created the Working Group on Internet Governance 
(WGIG) to identify public policy issues affecting Internet governance and to 
determine how national governments, international organizations, the private 
sector, and individuals around the world should work together in the develop-
ment and governance of the Internet.11  WGIG defined Internet governance as 
“the development and application by Governments, the private sector and civil 
society, in their respective roles, of shared principles, norms, rules, decision-
making procedures, and [programs] that shape the evolution and use of the 
Internet.”12  At the 2015 United Nations meeting of the General Assembly on 
the overall review of the implementation of outcomes of the World Summit 
on the Information Society (WSIS), the United Nations affirmed the 
 
 9 Id. at ¶ 44. 
 10 Id. at ¶¶ 44-45. 
 11 Working Group on Internet Governance, Rep. of the Working Group of Internet Gov-
ernance, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. 05.41622 (June 2005),    http://www.wgig.org/docs/WGIGREPO 
RT.pdf.  
 12 Id. at ¶ 4. 
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multistakeholder approach to Internet cooperation.13  The multistakeholder 
approach is designed to provide a balance of control amongst states and other 
stakeholders, as opposed to the multilateral approach for which China argued, 
where states regulate the Internet in their respective countries.14  The multi-
stakeholder model of the United Nations encourages the governance of the 
Internet by “civil society, businesses, academic institutions, engineers, and 
government.”15  While the United Nations rejected the multilateral approach, 
the organization recognized the Internet fosters continuing threats of curtail-
ing freedom of expression, invasion of privacy, and invasion and dispersion 
of private information and that states must take appropriate measures to pro-
tect human rights.16 
Some countries reject the multistakeholder approach to Internet govern-
ance in favor of a model of Internet sovereignty.  Proponents of Internet sov-
ereignty argue that each nation should have an “unfettered right” to regulate 
the Internet in its territory and to censor and restrict information within and 
across its boarders.17  China is the leading proponent of Internet sovereignty.  
While China’s constitution provides for freedom of speech and press, the 
country requires all Internet users within China to abide by Chinese law and 
for censorship of the Internet that reflects the authority and wishes of its po-
litical party.18  Websites such as Wikipedia, search engines, and social media 
platforms such as Facebook and Twitter are fully blocked or shut down during 
controversial events.19  China bans photos, video, and search terms that could 
spark social unrest. 20  China requires Google to de-index sites its government 
finds objectionable and utilizes The Golden Shield Program, known as the 
Great Firewall, to block its people from viewing foreign websites on the basis 
that these websites contain information they deem “a threat to national secu-
rity.”21  The government has left this term vague.  Additionally, Google lost a 
key dispute with the Chinese government when the company agreed to disable 
a censorship alert that was displayed when Chinese users accessed the search 
 
 13 G.A. Res. 70/125 (Dec. 16, 2015), http://workspace.unpan.org/sites/Internet/Docu-
ments/UNPAN96078.pdf. 
 14 William H. Dutton, Multistakeholder Internet Governance, WORLD DEV. REPORT 
(2016), http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/591571452529901419/WDR16-BP-Multistakeh 
older-Dutton.pdf.  
 15 Dan Levin, At U.N., China Tries to Influence Fight Over Internet Control, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 16, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/17/technology/china-wins-battle-
with-un-over-word-in-internet-control-document.html.  
 16 G.A. Res. 70/125, supra note 13, ¶ 49. 
 17 Levin, supra note 15. 
 18 Beina Xu & Elanor Albert, Media Censorship in China, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN 
RELATIONS (Feb. 17, 2017), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/media-censorship-china.  
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. Levin, supra note 15. 
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engine.22  China is joined in its quest for Internet sovereignty by Russia and 
the Group of 77, an organization comprised of developing countries.23 
 
B. Jurisdiction 
 
The issue created by the Canadian decision in Google Inc. v. Equustek is 
that the Canadian court is seeking to assert jurisdiction and sovereignty over 
globalized information.  In response to Microsoft v. USA, the Internet Gov-
ernance Project indicated that this “clash between cyberspace and political 
space” would provide countries with two basic choices and the following ef-
fects: 
Either 1) isolate themselves completely by requiring every In-
ternet service to keep all of their facilities and data in their ju-
risdiction and completely regulating all cross-border move-
ments of data; or 2) extend their jurisdiction beyond their 
territory and try to regulate services globally.  The first option, 
taken to its extreme, ends the Internet – it destroys the network 
effects and efficiency of the global Internet and creates a set of 
national walled gardens.  The second option destroys the 
whole model of national sovereignty, and opens up Internet 
services to a welter of conflicting jurisdictional require-
ments.24 
The jurisdiction of individual countries in cyberspace is complicated and 
problems arise because the Internet is trans-border and thus, not bound by 
traditional territorial lines.25  This creates issues because certain Internet con-
tent may be considered illegal or criminal in some countries while being legal 
in others.26  The Internet reaches over four billion users from almost 200 coun-
tries.27  Today most transactions or activities involve multiple jurisdictions 
and create possible conflicts of law as nations work to extend their jurisdiction 
extraterritoriality.28 
Canada follows the principle of comity and has arranged for reciprocal 
enforcement agreements with countries such as the United States, Australia, 
 
 22 Xu & Albert, supra note 18. 
 23 Kristen E. Eichensehr, The Cyber-Law of Nations, 103 GEO. L.J. 317 (2015). 
 24 Milton Mueller, What’s Really at Stake in the Microsoft v. USA Decision, INTERNET 
GOVERNANCE PROJECT (July 15, 2016), http://www.internetgovernance.org/2016/07/15/ 
whats-really-at-stake-in-the-microsoft-v-usa-decision/.  
 25 De La Chapelle & Fehlinger, supra note 1. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id.   
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and the United Kingdom.29  Thus, Canada relies on agreements with other 
countries to enforce its jurisdiction beyond its borders.  Canada approaches 
jurisdiction over the Internet in a way very similar to the United States by 
applying a “real and substantial connection” test.30  The Supreme Court of 
Canada has interpreted this to be a test “intended to capture the idea that there 
must be some claims to jurisdiction,” and suggested there was a need for 
“greater comity in our modern era when international transactions involve a 
constant flow of products, wealth and people across the globe.”31  Thus, the 
jurisdiction of Canadian courts is not bound by its territory. 
 
C. Cases Expanding Jurisdiction Extraterritoriality 
 
Prior to the final decision in Google Inc. v. Equustek, a British Columbia 
court heard Niemela v. Malamas, in which the plaintiff sought an injunction 
to compel Google Inc. to block 146 URLs that lead to websites providing de-
famatory comments about the plaintiff.32  Google voluntarily de-indexed the 
URLs on Google Canada, however refused to do so worldwide.33  The court 
refused to issue an injunction on the grounds that it would not be complied 
with because U.S. federal statues protect Google by blocking orders that 
would infringe on the right to free speech under the First Amendment.  How-
ever, Google may elect to voluntarily comply with such an order, because the 
federal statutes only prohibit a U.S. court from issuing an order compelling 
Google, Inc. to comply in the United States.34  In this case, the court narrowly 
rejected the claim “without really coming to grips with the extraterritoriality 
problem.”35 
Canada has not extended its jurisdiction extraterritoriality to defamation or 
right to privacy cases because the country prioritizes freedom of speech over 
privacy.36  However, there is an alarming trend in the European Union to re-
strict freedom of speech in favor of privacy by requiring Google to de-index 
 
 29 Arlan Gates, Canadian Law on Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, CHICAGO-KENT COLL. OF 
LAW (1999), http://www.kentlaw.edu/cyberlaw/docs/rfc/canadaview.html. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id.; Hunt v. T&N plc, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 289, para. 58. 
 32 Niemela v. Malamas, [2015] B.C.S.C. 1024 (Can.).  
   33 David Post, Worldwide Injunctions from British Columbia, WASH. POST (July 27, 
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2015/07/27/world-
wide-injunctions-from-british-columbia/?utm_term=.312de2ad372a.  
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Karen Zimmer, Privacy vs. Free Speech on the Internet: An update on the Right to be 
Forgotten and What is Happening at Home, DEFAMATION + PUBL’N RISK MGMT. L. BLOG 
(Aug. 22, 2017), http://defamationandrisklawblog.ahbl.ca/2017/08/22/privacy-vs-free-
speech-internet-update-right-forgotten-happeninghome/?utm_source=Mondaq&utm_me-
dium=syndication&utm_campaign=View-Original. 
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URLs.  Thus, the Canadian court is not the first court to issue orders for re-
moval of Internet content beyond its borders. 
In 2010, a Spanish citizen filed a complaint against Google Spain and 
Google Inc., claiming his privacy rights were violated by a newspaper article 
containing an old auction notice that appeared when his name was searched.37 
Spain referred the case, Google Spain v. AEPD, Marcio Osteja Gonzalez, to 
the Court of Justice of the European Union.38  The court decided that EU laws 
apply to search engines if they have a branch or subsidiary in a Member State, 
that data protection laws apply to search engines, and that individuals have 
“the right to be forgotten” which includes the power to ask search engines to 
remove links providing the public with their personal information when the 
information is inaccurate, inadequate, irrelevant, or excessive.39  However, the 
court indicated that “the right to be forgotten” is not absolute and that the 
determination should be made on a case-by-case basis so as to protect freedom 
of expression and other rights.40  This right was based on European Union 
data protection legislation, Directive 95/46/EC, which provides in Article 12 
“Rights of Access” that 
Member States shall guarantee every data subject the right to 
obtain from the controller: . . . (b) as appropriate the rectifica-
tion, erasure or blocking of data the processing of which does 
not comply with the provisions of this Directive, in particular 
because of the incomplete or inaccurate nature of the data.41 
Google was found to be a data controller because when a Google search 
of a person’s name is conducted the search engine processes personal data 
from third party web pages and formulates links to web pages with infor-
mation regarding the person.42  Additionally, the Directive provides in Article 
14, the right for the subject of the online data to object to the “processing of 
data relating to him . . . [and] [w]here there is a justified objection, the pro-
cessing instigated by the controller [of the data] may no longer involve those 
data.”43  This provision permitted the lawsuit against Google and the Directive 
 
 37 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos 
(AEPD), 2014 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 612CJ0131 (May 13, 2014).  
   38 Global Freedom of Expression, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección 
de Datos, COLUMBIA UNIV., https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/cases/google 
-spain-sl-v-agencia-espanola-de-proteccion-de-datos-aepd/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2019).  
 39 Case C-131/12, supra note 37.  
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. 
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applies throughout the European Union for protection beyond the domain of 
Google Spain.44 
In 2017, the Netherland’s highest court found a man had a right to be for-
gotten after conviction due to a viral video depicting him soliciting a hit on a 
pimp.  Google argued it was in the public interest for people to know about 
criminal activities.  However, the court expanded the right to be forgotten. 
France is now approaching the question of whether it was sufficient for 
Google to make infringing content inaccessible from all European domains, 
as a French data protection agency is arguing the links must be de-indexed 
worldwide.45  As France considers issuing the same order Canada issued in 
Google Inc. v. Equustek to de-index URLs worldwide, the EU’s right to be 
forgotten has resulted in extensive requests for the search engine to remove 
content. As of June 16, 2017, Google had received 734,289 requests from 
people within the European Union, approximately 43% of which were com-
plied with.46 
Google Inc. v. Equustek is not a defamation or privacy case.  However, it 
is being utilized in Canada to support the exercise of jurisdiction over the In-
ternet in privacy matters.  The Office of the Privacy Commission of Canada 
(OPCC) brought a claim that Globe24h.com was disseminating sensitive in-
formation “in relation to personal matters such as divorce proceedings, immi-
gration matters, health issues, and personal bankruptcies.”47  The complain-
ants were “alleging that links to Canadian court and tribunal decisions 
containing their personal information were appearing prominently in search 
results when their names were entered in common search engines.”48  In 
reaching its decision, the court acknowledged it would analyze the applicable 
law, the Personal Information Protection and Electronics Documents Act 
(PIPEDA), under the presumption that, “in the absence of clear words to the 
contrary, [] Parliament did not intend its legislation to receive extraterritorial 
application.”49  In T. (A.) v. Globe24h.com, a Canadian federal court held the 
Romanian operated website, www.Golbe24h.com, violated PIPEDA, and or-
dered the website operator “to remove all Canadian court and tribunal deci-
sions containing personal information . . . and [ to ] take the necessary steps 
to remove these decisions from search engine caches.”50  In T. (A.) v. 
Globe24h.com, the court relied on Google Inc. v. Equustek.  The Supreme 
Court subsequently upholding Google Inc. v. Equustek gives further credence 
to the federal court decision in T. (A.) v. Globe24h.com.51  Thus, Canada is 
 
 44 Zimmer, supra note 35. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 T. (A.) v. Globe24h.com, [2017] F.C. 114, ¶ 11 (Can.). 
 48 Id. ¶ 12. 
 49 Id. ¶ 55. 
 50 Id. at Judgment 2. 
 51 Post, supra note 33. 
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expanding its extraterritorial reach over Internet jurisdiction more frequently 
and over diversified types of claims. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
A. Expansion of Power 
 
The Google Inc.  v. Equustek decision expands the power of a nation’s 
court to control the Internet around the world by issuing an order to compel 
Canada to de-index URLs worldwide.52  This overstep of authority is vastly 
greater than the exertion of authority demonstrated in the right to be forgotten 
cases arising in Spain and the Netherlands, because as member countries of 
the European Union they essentially function as states of the same nation in 
the context of the right to privacy.53  The effects of the decisions reached by 
the European Court of Justice on European Union countries are analogous to 
the effects of a decision reached by the United States Supreme Court on every 
state.  Canada, on the other hand, is attempting to exert jurisdiction over coun-
tries it does not consider part of a cohesive functioning body with itself.  Fur-
ther, Canada is increasingly expanding the reasons for extending jurisdiction 
beyond its borders by issuing an injunction in an intellectual property case.  
The URLs at issue led to websites for the sale of Datalink’s infringing prop-
erty and were thus commercial speech.54  Commercial speech receives “more 
limited protection under international law.”55  However, this decision has the 
potential “to be used as precedent to justify abusive restrictions on the right to 
freedom of expression on a global scale by legitimizing the use of global 
takedown orders” and can lead to forum shopping.56 
The decision by Canada’s highest court stands directly against the Consti-
tution of the United States and the statutory speech protections that United 
States citizens esteem.57  The Electronic Frontier Foundation intervened in 
Google Inc. v. Equustek to explain how 
 
 52 Id. 
 53 Stefan Kulk, Freedom of Expression and ‘Right to be Forgotten’ Cases in the Neth-
erlands After Google Spain, 2 EUR. DATA PROTECTION L. REV. 113, 115 (2015). 
 54 Google Inc. v. Equustek Solutions Inc., [2017] 1 S.C.R. 34 (Can). 
 55 Global Freedom of Expression, Google Inc. v. Equustek Solutions, COLUMBIA UNIV.,  
https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/cases/equustek-solutions-inc-v-jack-2/ 
(last visited Mar. 11, 2019).  
 56 Aaron Mackey, Corynne McSherry & Vera Ranieri, Top Canadian Court Permits 
Worldwide Internet Censorship, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (June 28, 2017), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2017/06/top-canadian-court-permits-worldwide-internet-
censorship. 
 57 Id. 
786 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. [Vol. 47:777 
 [i]ssuing an order that would cut off access to information for 
U.S. users would set a dangerous precedent for online speech. 
In essence, it would expand the power of any court in the world 
to edit the entire Internet, whether or not the targeted material 
or site is lawful in another country.58 
Canada’s ability to remove Internet content worldwide sets a dangerous 
precedent and legitimizes the practice for countries with repressive regimes 
that drastically restrict freedom of expression.  If this decision is effective in 
its goal, what would stop China from attempting to restrict Google’s conduct 
around the world in the same way it does within its own country?  The Elec-
tronic Frontier Foundation further argued that Canada’s approach would lead 
to “a race to the bottom . . . [with] individuals engag[ing] in international fo-
rum-shopping to impose the one country’s restrictive laws regarding free ex-
pression on the rest of the world.”59  Those seeking to remove content from 
the Internet, which countries such as the United States or Canada might find 
to be within the protection of the freedom of expression, might seek its re-
moval from the judiciary in nations like China or Iran.  This forum shopping 
has been referred to as creating the potential for “censorship tourism” in Brit-
ish Columbia.60  The Supreme Court of Canada largely ignored the concerns 
raised, because Google was subject to Canadian jurisdiction due to its sub-
stantial contact with the country.61  The court indicated that it did not see free-
dom of expression concerns weighing in Google’s favor after a balance of the 
convenience test and held that “[i]f Google has evidence that complying with 
such an injunction would require it to violate the laws of another jurisdiction, 
including interfering with freedom of expression, it is always free to apply to 
the British Columbia courts to vary the interlocutory order accordingly.”62 
The burden of proof should not be on a non-party to show that an injunc-
tion violates the laws of another country.63  “[I]nnocent third part[ies] to a 
lawsuit should not have to shoulder the burden o[f] proving whether an in-
junction violates the laws of another country.  Although companies like 
Google may be able to afford such costs, many others will not, meaning many 
 
 58 Id. 
 59 Mackey, supra note 54. 
 60 Post, supra note 34 (explaining that plaintiffs could “combin[e] a nice vacation in 
beautiful Vancouver while also getting a court to issue you a worldwide injunction against 
Google listings for sites against which you might have some sort of a claim.”). See also 
David Post, Worldwide Injunctions From British Columbia, WASH. POST (July 27, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/07/27/worldwide-in-
junctions-from-british-columbia/?utm_term=.aec3ef08f4bc.  
 61 Mackey, supra note 54. 
 62 Google Inc. v. Equustek Solutions Inc., [2017] 1 S.C.R. 34 (Can.). 
 63 Mackey, supra note 54. 
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overboard and unlawful orders may go unchallenged.”64  If the court decides 
the situation demands such an order, the burden should be on the party seeking 
the order to establish there is no violation of foreign laws protecting free 
speech.65 
 
B. How should Google Inc.  v. Equustek have been decided 
 
The court held that “it hardly seems equitable to deny Equustek the extra-
territorial scope it needs to make the remedy effective, or even to put the onus 
on it to demonstrate, country by country, where such an order is legally per-
missible.”66  This seems at odds with the court’s prior interpretations of Ca-
nadian legislation.  The court has indicated in prior decisions that, 
While the Parliament of Canada, unlike the legislatures of the 
Provinces, has the legislative competence to enact laws having 
extraterritorial effect, it is presumed not to intend to do so, in 
the absence of clear words or necessary implication to the con-
trary.  This is because “[i]n our modern world of easy travel 
and with the emergence of a global economic order, chaotic 
situations would often result if the principle of territorial juris-
diction were not, at least generally respected.”67 
Thus, the issuing of injunctions worldwide should be presumed impermis-
sible, until demonstrated otherwise.  The court should have exercised caution 
in extending its jurisdiction beyond its borders and demonstrated respect for 
traditional territorial jurisdiction. 
Google Inc. v. Equustek was wrongly decided. The dissent in Google Inc. 
v. Equustek argued that the court had jurisdiction to grant the order against 
Google.  However, the dissent argued the court should have exercised judicial 
restraint because 
the Google Order enjoins a non-party, yet Google has not 
aided or abetted Daltalink’s wrongdoing; it holds no assets of 
Equustek’s and has no information relevant to the underlying 
proceedings.  The Google order is mandatory and requires 
 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Google, [2017] 1 S.C.R. ¶ 47.2. 
 67 T. (A.) v. Globe24h.com, [2017] F.C. 114, ¶ 54 (Can.) (quoting Tolofson v. Jensen, 
[1994] 120 D.L.R. (4th) 289,  ¶ 54 (Can.)).  
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court supervision.  It has not been shown to be effective, and 
Equustek has alternative remedies.68 
The court could have handled the resolution of the case in a way that poses 
less of a threat to the freedom of expression on the Internet.  “An equitable 
remedy is not required unless there is no other appropriate remedy at law.”69 
The dissent correctly argued in agreement with the Court of Appeals of British 
Columbia that Equustek should seek a remedy in France because it appeared 
that Datalink’s associates currently reside in France and “French courts will 
assume jurisdiction and entertain an application to freeze the assets in that 
country.”70  This option would allow a remedy at law through financial com-
pensation, awarding Equustek damages out of Datalink’s assets located in 
France. 
Google voluntarily de-indexed the URLs in Canada.  Instead of issuing a 
worldwide injunction, the court could have requested a voluntary de-indexing 
in the countries where Equustek was suffering the greatest loss of sales to 
Datalink.  The European “right to privacy” cases have resulted in Google re-
ceiving requests for removal of personal information.  Google then evaluates 
the request.71  A similar strategy could have been adopted here.  Google may 
have found a request for de-indexing only in the countries where Datalink is 
receiving the most sales to be less threatening to its rights as a search engine 
than a demand for de-indexing globally. 
Additionally, Equustek could have sought an injunction in countries 
around the world where significant sales were lost to Datalink.  This approach 
would have allowed each country to maintain jurisdiction over commercial 
speech and sales of infringing products. 
The best way for the Supreme Court of Canada to have responded in this 
case was a combination of all three suggestions.  By following this Note’s 
suggested approaches, the Supreme Court of Canada could have protected 
Equustek’s interest in its sales.  Equustek would be financially compensated 
with damages for lost sales, and if Google refused to de-list the URLs in coun-
tries with the highest amount of infringing sales Equustek could have sought 
an injunction in those countries.  The majority believed since the problem oc-
curred online, it occurred globally, and thus, the only way to prevent irrepa-
rable harm would be de-indexing the URLs globally.72  That assertion is not 
true.  Instead if an injunction was issued in countries that produced the most 
sales for Datalink, Equustek would no longer suffer irreparable harm. 
 
   68 Google, [2017] 1 S.C.R. ¶67 (Côté and Rowe JJ.,  dissenting).  
 69 Id. ¶81.  
 70 Id. 
 71 Eloïse Gratton & Jules Polonetsky, Droit A’L’Oubli: Canadian Perspective on the 
Global ‘Right to be Forgotten Debate’, 15 COLO TECH. L.J. 337, 341-42 (2017).  
 72 Id. 
2019] INTERNET EXTRATERRITORIALITY 789 
It may be argued that individuals in countries where an injunction has 
taken effect can circumvent this restriction by accessing the Internet through 
a virtual private network (VPN).  VPNs could be used to access a server out-
side of the country of residence to access Internet that contains Datalink 
URLs.  For example, VPNs are frequently utilized in China to “tunnel[] traffic 
to a server outside of China with unfiltered Internet” to circumvent the exten-
sive censorship.73  Buyers of Equustek products seem unlikely to go through 
this much effort to purchase technology from Datalink that is readily available 
from Equustek.   
Others may argue that it is not economically feasible for Equustek to seek 
an injunction in multiple forums.  However, this does not justify an improper 
exercise of jurisdiction. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Google Inc. v. Equustek is part 
of an increasing trend for one country to decide access to the Internet and 
Internet content beyond its borders. 
The decision affords a new – but exceptional – remedy to vic-
tims of IP infringements, and possibly of privacy violations, 
data breaches, and defamatory comments.  In some circum-
stances, such victims might be able to obtain a court order that 
will impede access to the objectionable content, not just within 
Canada but anywhere in the world.74 
Both the majority and minority of the court focused narrowly on the factual 
situation of the case before it, without elaborate response to the concerns 
raised about the issues this precedent could create for freedom of expression.75 
The case was wrongly decided and could lead to unfortunate limitations 
on free speech as oppressive regimes attempt to exert the same type of world-
wide injunctive power over Internet search engines, social media platforms, 
and webpages generally.  The target content of oppressive regimes could be 
“politically or religiously sensitive material.”76  If Canada legitimizes control 
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http://www.eloisegratton.com/blog/2017/07/05/%E2%80%8Bgoogle-inc-v-equustek-so-
lutions-inc-supreme-court-gives-the-green-light-to-global-orders-to-take-down-search-re-
sults/. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. 
790 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. [Vol. 47:777 
over the Internet worldwide, it is easy for jurisdictions “that might not share 
our conception of fundamental rights and freedoms” to exert the same power 
by citing Google Inc. v. Equustek as precedent.77 
Even though its decision was limited to the narrow case before it, the Su-
preme Court of Canada should have followed the recommended approach 
when faced with the Equustek issue.  Courts should not attempt to exert ex-
traterritoriality jurisdiction over the Internet in pursuit of stopping infringing 
technology sales when there are alternative resolutions to the issue and when 
harm to an innocent third party results as it did here.  Monetary damages 
should have been recovered in France and the court should have requested 
Google to de-index URLs in areas of high Datalink sales.  If Google refused 
to de-index the URLs then injunctions should have been sought in the coun-
tries with high Datalink sales. 
Canada erred in its decision and Google should not comply with the cur-
rent injunction.  Canada should not attempt to force Google into compliance. 
Instead, countries should work together following the multistakeholder ap-
proach to Internet governance to effect change and combat Internet crime 
without one country gaining too much power or control over the Internet and 
its content.  The multistakeholder approach must consider not only the goal 
of stopping crime but the equally important goal of maintaining freedom of 
expression.  It must be remembered that even countries with liberal laws re-
garding freedom of expression diverge on priorities, so if this decision stands 
it has the potential to create disputes between the United States and the Euro-
pean Union, who differ greatly on the importance of the “right to be forgot-
ten.”78 
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